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Abstract: A curious feature of the literature on motivational judgement internalism is the 
absence of a discussion of which moral judgements are expected to motivate and how. This 
dissertation aims to address this issue by investigating what account an internalist can give 
of judgements of supererogation. This investigation will proceed in three stages. First I will 
investigate the difference between judging that something is a moral obligation and 
judging that it is supererogatory. I will argue that, unlike judgements of obligation, there is 
no reliable connection between judgements of supererogation and motivation. Next I will 
look at what account a judgement internalist can give of the necessary connection between 
moral judgements and motivation that is compatible with existence of moral judgements 
that we do not expect people to be motivated by. I will argue that an all things considered 
reasons internalism is able to give such an  account but cannot explain the motivational 
power of judgements of supererogation. I will then argue that positing an internal 
connection between judgements of supererogation and feelings of admiration allows for an 
internalist account that is capable of explaining the ability of judgements of supererogation 
to motivate.
Word Count:14938
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Chapter 1 – Is there a reliable connection between moral judgements and 
motivation?
Motivational judgement internalism is a theory about the nature of moral judgements that 
claims that there is a “necessary” connection between moral judgements and motivation1 
(Darwall 1983 p.54). In other words, part of the nature of moral judgements is that they are 
motivating. Motivational externalism on the other hand is the view that any connection that 
exists between moral judgements and motivation is contingent and dependent on the 
dispositions of the person making the judgement. Internalists claim that their view is more 
appealing because only internalism is able to provide a plausible account of  “the reliable 
connection” between moral judgements and motivation (Smith 1994 p.76). However, these 
claims lack an account of which moral judgements are being referred to. The aim of this 
chapter will be to investigate whether this claim can plausibly be made about two different 
types of moral judgement. The first type of moral judgement I will look at is a judgement 
that an act, or potential act, is morally obligatory. The second type of moral judgement I 
will look at is a judgement that an act is supererogatory. I will start by outlining why 
internalists argue that this claim adds to the appeal of their view. I will then investigate 
whether it is plausible to make this claim about judgements of obligation and judgements 
of supererogation. I will argue that this claim can plausibly be made about judgements of 
moral obligation but not judgements of supererogation. 
First we should consider why internalists claim to be better placed to explain the reliable 
connection that they claim exists between moral judgements and motivation. Smith argues 
that the motivation of strong willed people tracks their moral judgements (1994 p.71). In 
other words, moral judgements are connected to motivation in such a way that we expect 
strong willed people to generally become motivated to do what they believe is right and to 
lose motivation for what they believe to be wrong. For example, if a strong willed meat 
eater becomes convinced that eating meat is wrong then we would expect that person to 
1 Darwall distinguishes this from what he calls “existence internalism” which holds that in order for an act 
to be rational or right it must be capable of motivating (1983 p.54).
Page 4 of 47
 
stop eating meat. If someone made this judgement and continued to eat meat then we 
would not describe them as strong willed. 
An acceptable account of moral judgements must be able to explain this connection. The 
connection can be explained as being internal to the moral judgement or as being external 
to it (Smith 1994 p.72). Smith argues that an explanation that holds that the connection is 
external to the judgement is committed to an implausible view of moral motivation (1994 
p.74). Such a view would have to posit the existence of a motivation that is explicitly 
moral such as the desire “to do the right thing where this is read de dicto and not de re” 
(1994 p.74). In other words, externalist explanations of the connection between moral 
judgement and motivation will need to invoke a further desire to do the right thing, 
whatever that happens to be. Smith argues that this explanation depends upon the existence 
of a step in the mental process of the moral agent that does not exist. We expect people to 
be motivated by the features of an act that make it right not by its 'rightness'. Smith argues 
that an agent with this extra thought would be regarded as a  “moral fetishist” (1994 p.74)2. 
The internalist explanation is preferable as it does not make a fetish of morality.
Let's accept for now that this is a genuine advantage that counts in favour of the internalist 
position if their claim about the reliable connection between judgement and motivation is 
accepted. The question we must now ask is: Of the moral judgements that we make, which, 
if any, does this apply to? I will start by investigating whether they apply to judgements of 
moral obligation before going on to look at how they apply to judgements of 
supererogation. I will do this by looking at what our expectations would be for someone 
who made these judgements.
Let’s start by looking at moral obligation. There are many competing accounts of moral 
obligation and it is outwith the scope of this paper to adjudicate between them. I intend 
instead to outline a view of moral obligation that I find attractive and explain briefly why I 
2For an argument to support an externalist explanation for this connection see Sigrun Svavarsdóttir (1999)
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find it attractive. 
A plausible conception of moral obligation can be found in the work of John Stuart Mill. 
Mill argues that, “Duty is a thing which may be exacted from a person as one exacts a 
debt.” (2004 Chapter 5).On Mill’s account, if an act is morally obligatory then we can 
demand that people perform that act. Darwall builds on Mill’s account of moral obligation 
by introducing the idea of “the second person standpoint.” (2006 p.1) To evaluate 
something from this standpoint is to evaluate from the perspective we take when we make 
and accept claims on each others conduct (2006 p.1). Darwall’s account of obligation is 
linked to accountability. When we evaluate from the second person standpoint we think 
about the attitudes we would hold towards an agent and their behaviour if we were 
confronted by it. To hold someone morally obliged is to address them in a way that gives 
them reasons for acting. Someone has a moral obligation to act in a certain way if that way 
of acting could be legitimately demanded of them (Darwall 2006 p.27). If they do not act 
in this way then they are the legitimate target of punishment. The authority to make such 
an address comes from shared membership of a moral community (2006 p.7). As members 
of a moral community we are accountable to one another and have the authority to make 
demands of each other’s conduct in relation to others. If someone is thought to have a 
moral obligation to act in a certain way then they are judged to have most reason to act in 
this way. As Darwall points out, “it makes no sense to blame someone for doing something 
and then add that he had, nonetheless, sufficient reason to do it, all things considered. 
(2006 p.28). Someone who is able to show that they did not have most reason to act in the 
way that is being demanded of them will have shown that they had no moral obligation to 
act in that way.   
I do not have space here to engage in a thorough defence of this account and intend only to 
show why I find it appealing. As Watson points out, one of the attractive features of 
Darwall’s account of moral obligation is that it offers a response to Anscombe’s challenge 
(2007 p.37). This challenge asks where the authority of moral demands come from in the 
absence of a divine law giver (Anscombe 1958 p.2). Darwall’s account of moral obligation 
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is able to meet this challenge by claiming that the authority to make moral demands comes 
from members of a shared moral community holding each other to account (Watson 2007 
p.38). Of course much more can be said about whether this theory will stand up to intense 
scrutiny but that is the task for another project3.  
Let’s think now about what it means for someone to judge that they have a moral 
obligation and how we would expect someone who made a judgement of this sort to act. If 
someone judges that they have a moral obligation to act in a certain way then they are 
judging that other members of the moral community can legitimately demand that they act 
in a particular way. Someone who judges that he does not have most reason to act in this 
way does not judge that he is under obligation to act in that way. We expect strong willed 
people who judge that they have most reason to act in a particular way to be motivated to 
do so. Someone who judges that they have an obligation but is unmotivated by it will not 
be thought to be strong willed. The reason for this is that we expect people to be motivated 
by their judgements about what there is most reason to do. We expect this because there is 
a reliable connection between judging that you have most reason to act in a particular way 
and being motivated to act in that way. The internalist claim about the reliable connection 
between moral judgements and motivation is convincing when we consider judgements of 
moral obligation.
This is only the case if we assume that moral obligations are always what we have most 
reason to do. In his book Brute Rationality, Joshua Gert argues that we should not accept 
this. Gert distinguishes between reasons that constitute requirements of rationality and 
those which provide rational justification (2004 p.23). Justifying reasons can explain action 
and give an account of why it was reasonable for an agent to have acted in a particular way 
(2004 p.24). Rational requirements, on the other hand, must be acted upon in order for an 
agent to maintain rationality (Gert 2004 p.23). Gert argues that the two should be seen 
separately. Justifying reasons can explain action, can give an account of why an agent acts 
in a certain way but they need not lead to requirements (2004 p.24). Gert then goes on to 
3  For a discussion of Darwall’s account of moral obligation see Ethics Vol.118 No.1 Symposium on 
Darwall’s Second Person Standpoint.
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claim that moral reasons only ever give justifying reasons and never provide rational 
requirements. In support of his claim Gert gives an example of someone who is deciding 
whether to spend their money on a bottle of wine or give it to charity (2004 p.26). Gert 
argues that while this person would be justified in giving their money to charity we would 
not call them irrational if they spent the money on the wine. If we accept Gert’s point then 
we will no longer have reason to think that judgements of moral obligation are what we 
have most reason to do.
Gert makes an interesting point in distinguishing between requirements of rationality and 
justifying reasons. However, Gert is wrong to claim that moral reasons can only ever 
provide justifying reasons. Returning to Darwall’s account of moral obligation will allow 
us to see why this is the case. Darwall understood moral obligations as the legitimate 
demands that members of the moral community can address to one another. The ability to 
make demands of one another comes from a “second personal competence” (2006 p.29). 
This is the ability to make and accept legitimate demands to and from other members of 
the moral community. In order to make legitimate demands of people you must be a 
member of a shared moral community. If this is the case then the demands will also apply 
to you. To judge that you have a moral obligation is to demand a certain course of action 
from yourself. It certainly seems reasonable to claim that when someone demands of 
herself that they act in a certain way, they are rationally required to act in that way. Of 
course we might think that there are no moral obligations. Nevertheless, if people judge 
that something is obligatory then this does seem to provide a rational requirement. If we 
accept this interpretation of moral obligation then we will expect people to be motivated to 
act in line with what they judge to be a moral obligation. We should therefore accept the 
internalist's claim about the reliable connection between moral judgements and motivation 
when applied to judgements of obligation. 
Gert would reject this account of the link between morality and rational requirements 
because accepting such a link means that people who act immorally can no longer be held 
to be morally responsible (2004 p.82). If we claim that people who act immorally act 
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irrationally and that rationality is a requirement for moral responsibility then we are forced 
into the unattractive position of being unable to hold anyone responsible for their immoral 
actions (2004 p.82). Gert argues that this gives us reason to reject the claim that moral 
reasons provide rational requirements (2004 p.83)
However, I think this criticism rests on a simplistic account of moral responsibility. As 
Darwall argues, making a moral demand of someone involves an assumption that the 
person being addressed is competent of understand and responding to such demands (2006 
p.75). If someone is capable of understanding and responding to moral reasons then it is 
appropriate to make moral demands of them. This involves more than simply accepting 
that a demand has been made of them and responding to it. Darwall argues that in order to 
be held morally responsible it is important that the person being addressed possesses 
“second personal competence” (2006 p.75). This means that they must be capable of 
recognising the legitimacy of such demands and holding herself and others to these types 
of demand (2006 p.78). This is what moral responsibility consists of from Darwall's view. 
If someone is capable of recognising the legitimacy of moral demands and responding to 
them then they are morally responsible. The fact that such a person may on occasion fail to 
act in line with the moral demands that are made of them does not remove them of this 
responsibility. There is no reason to think then that judging that someone has acted 
irrationally makes us unable to hold them morally responsible for their actions. Only if 
someone is incapable of recognising and responding to moral demands would we no longer 
think them to be fitting subjects of blame. 
We can clarify this discussion by distinguishng between irrational and arational agents. An 
irrational agent is one who is capable of acting in line with reasons but happens not to on a 
particular occasion. An arational agent on the other hand is one that is incapable of 
recognising and responding to reason. Darwall's account of moral responsibility allows us 
to hold irrational agents responsible but not arational agents. This means that this account 
is capable of holding immoral agents morally responsible, so long as they are capable of 
responding to moral demands. We should therefore accept the internalist's claim about the 
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reliable connection between moral judgements and motivation when applied to judgements 
of obligation as Gert’s objections give us no reason to think that moral reasons are 
incapable of providing rational requirements.
Let’s look now at judgements of supererogation. In 2007 a man collapsed onto the tracks at 
a Subway station in New York as a train was approaching. Seconds later Wesley Autrey 
jumped onto the tracks and held the man down as the train came to a halt above their heads 
(Carwell 2007). Risking your own life to save that of another is an act that deserves high 
moral praise. What is interesting about Autrey's case is that it is not only morally good but 
it also seems reasonable to think that acting in the way that Autrey did is not morally 
required. After all, it seems almost inconceivable that anyone would have criticised Autrey 
had he not acted in this way. Furthermore, the fact that this act is not one we would expect 
most people to perform partly explains the level of praise received by Autrey. Acts like 
Autrey's that are morally good without being morally required are called supererogatory 
acts. 
The term 'supererogation' originates from the idea of giving more than is asked (Heyd 1982 
p.1). J. O. Urmson opened the contemporary discussion of the concept. He argued that the 
traditional view of moral action which classifies actions as either moral duties, morally 
indifferent or forbidden by morality is insufficient (1958 p.60). Ursmon argued that this 
account leaves no room for acts that are good but not moral duties such as the actions of 
saints and heroes (1958 p.61). Such actions go beyond what is demanded by our moral 
duties (Urmson 1958 p.65). Because supererogatory acts are not obligatory we do not 
expect people to perform these actions nor do we blame or punish those who fail to 
perform them (Mellema 1991 p.5).
Heyd argues that “continuity” is an important aspect of the relationship between duty and 
supererogation (1982 p.5). In order for an act to be considered supererogatory Heyd argues 
that the act must have the same sort of value as that of the moral obligation that it goes 
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beyond (1982 p.5). The performance of a supererogatory act has the same type of value as 
the performance of the related moral obligation but to a greater extent (Heyd 1982 p.5). 
Mellema argues that this means that overall value is increased to a greater degree when an 
act does not fulfil a moral obligation (1991 p.28). The continuity requirement allows us to 
see how supererogation and obligation relate to each other. Fulfilling a moral obligation 
and performing an act that goes beyond that obligation are both acts which have the same 
sort of value. However, the supererogatory act realises a greater amount of that value than 
the obligatory act.
Our discussion of supererogation up to now has focussed entirely on actions so let's now 
look at what it is to judge that something is supererogatory. To make a judgement of this 
sort is to judge that an act is one that goes beyond what is morally obligatory, that the 
person performing the act is a fitting subject for moral praise and that those who pass on 
the opportunity to act in such a way do not deserve to be the subject of blame or criticism. 
As a result, making a supererogatory judgement does not bring about any expectation of 
action4. If someone tells me that they think giving money to charity is supererogatory then 
I would not be surprised to find out that this person gives money to charity nor would I be 
surprised to find out that they don't. 
It would be a significant drawback of the account of obligation and supererogation that I 
have given here if it was unable to accommodate important features of the relationship 
between these two kinds of action. Kamm argues that one of the features of this 
relationship is that it can sometimes be permissible to forego what is morally obligatory in 
favour of an act of supererogation (2001 p.313). Kamm backs this up with the following 
example. Suppose I have made an arrangement to meet a friend for lunch. We might think 
that this means that I have a moral obligation to do so. However, on the way to lunch I pass 
a car crash and volunteer to give up my kidney in order to save the life of one of the 
4 At least not in the abstract. We might think that if we know the person making the judgement then we 
might be able to form a reasonable expectation. For example, if we know that the person  is a moral saint 
then we might expect this person to be motivated by judgements of supererogation. Whereas, if the judger 
is someone who only ever does what they judge to be the minimum requirements of morality then we 
would expect this judgement not to motivate.
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victims of the crash causing me to miss lunch. This seems like it is an act of 
supererogation. It is not only a morally permissible act but one deserving high moral praise 
and intuitively I had no obligation to donate my kidney (2001 p.314). It seems morally 
acceptable to choose this act over my obligation to keep my lunch date. Kamm concludes 
that it may sometimes be morally permissible or even praiseworthy to choose an act of 
supererogation over an obligation (2001 p.314). This causes a problem for the account that 
I have given of moral obligation and supererogation. If it is permissible to choose an act of 
supererogation over an obligation then it seems that it is rational to do so. If we accept this 
then we must reject my account of moral obligation which claimed that it is irrational to 
fail to be motivated to do what you judge you have a moral obligation to do.
However, Kamm’s argument does not work against the way that I have understood moral 
obligation. Earlier in the chapter I said that if someone shows that they did not have most 
reason to act a certain way then we cannot call that way of acting morally obligatory. 
Kamm is right to say that there are occasions in which we can choose to do something 
supererogatory instead of a moral obligation. However, in choosing to do the 
supererogatory act the alternative stops being obligatory. To apply this to Kamm’s 
example, once the decision has been made to donate the kidney there is no longer an 
obligation to meet the friend for lunch. No one would be blamed for doing this and no one 
could legitimately demand that their friend choose to keep their lunch date rather than save 
a life.
This raises an interesting question as to what it means to say that something is obligatory if 
there remains an option to act differently. A tempting way to respond to this would be to 
say that moral obligations are disjunctive. Perhaps there will always be a range of ways in 
which we can fulfil our obligations. A plausible way of thinking about this is that to have a 
moral obligation to perform an act is to be required to perform that act or one which brings 
about greater value. If someone has an obligation to keep their lunch date then this should 
really be seen as an obligation to keep the lunch date or do something which brings about 
greater value. By donating the kidney we fulfil our obligation to either keep the lunch date 
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or do something that brings about more value. This seems like a plausible thing to say for 
an account of obligation that is linked to accountability. If we choose to perform an act of 
greater value than an act we have an obligation to perform then it seems reasonable to 
think that no one would think us blameworthy for this. We can now see why it is 
permissible to miss the lunch date in order to donate a kidney. Donating a kidney is an act 
of far greater value than attending a lunch date and so this act fulfils the obligation to either 
keep the lunch date or perform an act that brings about greater value.
If donating the kidney in the above example can be thought of as a way of fulfilling a 
moral obligation then we might think that it can no longer be described as an act of 
supererogation. However, I think that even though this act fulfils an obligation we can still 
think of this as a supererogatory act. If we have a range of ways in which we can fulfil the 
obligation to keep the lunch date then those that go beyond the minimum level of sacrifice 
and also bring more than the minimum level of value can be thought of supererogatory as 
they go beyond the basic requirements of moral obligation. This does not mean that all acts 
of supererogation fulfil an obligation rather that this can be seen as one type of 
supererogatory act. We might perform an act of supererogation when we had no moral 
obligations to act a certain way.
Given what we have said so far about supererogatory acts this account appears 
problematic. We said earlier that an act of supererogation has greater value than the 
corresponding moral obligation. If we accept this and we accept that moral obligations 
always allow us to perform an act of more value than what we are obliged to do. Suppose 
Jane comes home to find her house on fire with her son and his friend trapped inside. 
Suppose that it is only possible for Jane to rescue one and attempting to do so will put her 
own life at significant risk. We might think that parents have special obligations of care to 
their offspring and because of this Jane has a moral obligation to save her son. Let's also 
accept that Jane has no obligation to risk her life in order to save her son's friend and that 
to do so would be supererogatory. If we accept the above account of supererogation then 
we are forced to say that in this situation it is preferable for Jane to save her son's friend 
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rather than her son as this is a supererogatory act and therefore of more value than the 
moral obligation. 
We can respond to this problem by distinguishing between agent-relative and agent-neutral 
value. We can think of this distinction in terms of what Schroeder calls “better than 
relations” (2007 p.268). This is a way of expressing preferences for one state of affairs 
over another. A value is agent-relative if for someone with a particular involvement in a 
situation, what is better for them differs to what is better for an impartial observer 
(Suikkanen 2009 p.6). If we accept that the relevant value in a disjunctive obligation may 
be agent-relative then the next issue we must face is deciding which agent is the value 
relative to. A natural response to this would be to say that it is the person performing the 
act whose preferences are taken into account. However, this is problematic for the 
following reason. Suppose I have a moral obligation to visit a friend in hospital. I think 
about doing this but decide that going out for dinner with healthy friends would bring 
about more that I find valuable than going to the hospital. It would be an odd account of 
moral obligation that accepted that this is a satisfactory way of fulfilling my obligation. A 
more plausible account would be to take the preferences of the person who is owed the 
obligation into account. On this account if I have a moral obligation towards a certain 
person then I must either perform the act I am obligated to do or perform an act which is 
held to be more valuable by that person. This allows us to explain why it is not permissible 
for Jane to save the friend rather than the son as for the son a world in which he is saved 
but his friend is not is better than a world in which only his friend is saved.
Another objection that could be made is that it is a mistake to think that we need to 
accommodate supererogatory judgements. Given that we can deny the existence of acts of 
supererogation perhaps we can also deny the existence of judgements of supererogation. 
Urmson argued that supererogation caused problems for traditional ethical theories as they 
could not accommodate the concept. However, it could be argued that the fact that a 
normative ethical theory is incompatible with supererogation does not in itself show that 
we should reject the moral theory. We might think that this gives us reason to abandon the 
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concept of supererogation instead. As Zimmerman points out, the fact the most significant 
moral theories seem to have difficulty accommodating supererogation might give us reason 
to think that supererogation is impossible (1996 p.237). Perhaps then we should treat the 
problems that ethical theories have had explaining supererogation not as evidence against 
those theories but as reason to abandon the concept. We might also think that if a theory 
about the nature of moral judgements was found to be incompatible with judgements of 
supererogation then this gives us reason to think such judgements don't exist5.
However, such an argument is unlikely to convince anybody. While it seems reasonable to 
think that a plausible argument could be made against the existence of supererogatory acts 
it does not seem plausible to use such an argument to deny the existence of judgements of 
supererogation6. That such judgements exist strikes me as an intuition that cannot be 
denied. As Attfield argues, acts of supererogation are established features of common sense 
morality in most societies (Attfield 1995 p.116). Heroes and saints receive special 
recognition in the form of medals, ceremonies and public adoration because they are 
judged to have gone beyond what is morally obligatory in a particularly impressive way. 
This recognition goes beyond the acknowledgement accorded to those who are judged to 
have acted in line with moral duty throughout their lives. Such people may receive 
recognition but this recognition is likely to be muted in comparison and typically will be 
accorded only upon death or retirement. This special recognition given to those who are 
judged to have done more than is required of them is firm evidence that make judgements 
of supererogation. Someone might deny that they make such judgements but how could 
they convince anyone that no one else does? In the same way, we could deny the existence 
of moral facts, as error theorists do7, but any argument against the existence of moral 
judgements is unlikely to be taken seriously. We can debate whether or not these 
5 Elizabeth M. Pybus argues for a related position (1981). She argues from the fact that moral 
commendation involves a desire to emulate that acts of supererogation do not exist. While I think Pybus 
was right to point to an incompatibility between judgement internalism (without actually using this term) 
and supererogation, I think that given the debate that exists between internalism and externalism we 
should not assume that if such an incompatibility exists that this shows that supererogatory acts do not 
exist. 
6 One way in which it might be denied is by appealing to a global eliminative materialist theory that holds 
that beliefs and desires do not exist. I do not have space to explore such a response here. Arguments 
against this theory can be found in Kitcher (1984) an Stich (1996)
7 For example, Richard Joyce (2001)
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judgements are correct and whether acts of supererogation are possible. What seems 
impossible to deny is that these judgements exist.
Let’s briefly sum up what has been said so far. Judgement internalists claim that there is a 
necessary connection between moral judgements and motivation. Internalists have claimed 
that their theory is preferable to externalism as it is able to explain the fact that a change in 
motivation generally follows from a change in moral judgement. In this chapter I have 
investigated which positive moral judgements we would expect people to be motivated by. 
I have argued that there is a reliable connection between judgements of obligation and 
motivation. However, the same cannot be said for judgements of supererogation. There is 
no reliable connection between judging that an act is supererogatory and being motivated 
to do it. 
Accepting this poses a challenge to judgement internalists. As it stands the claim that there 
is a necessary connection between moral judgements and motivation is under threat. The 
fact that judgements of supererogation will not always result in motivation suggests that 
there is no necessary connection between the two. The internalist must provide an account 
of the necessary connection between moral judgements and motivation that is supported by 
the reliable connection between judgements of obligation and motivation but is also able to 
account for the lack of this connection for judgements of supererogation. The next chapter 
of this paper will look at how an internalist could meet this challenge. 
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Chapter 2 – Can internalism accommodate judgements of supererogation?
In the last chapter I argued that a reliable connection between motivation and judgements 
of moral obligation exists but that there is no such connection for judgements of 
supererogation. This creates a challenge for internalists. They must account for the 
necessary connection between moral judgements and motivation in a way that is 
compatible with the existence of a reliable connection between some moral judgements but 
not others. In this chapter I will investigate what kind of connection is capable of achieving 
this. In answering this question we will examine whether the connection is unbreakable, 
what level of motivation comes from making a moral judgement and whether the 
connection is between any moral judgement or an 'all things considered' normative 
judgement to which a particular moral judgement may play a contributory role. In this 
chapter I will examine these issues and then propose an alternative necessary connection 
between judgements of supererogation and feelings of admiration. I will defend this 
connection against various ways in which it could be argued that these feelings are not 
always compatible with such judgements.
Let's deal with the first issue. Internalists have said that there is a necessary connection 
between moral judgement and motivation. This could be interpreted to mean that whenever 
someone makes a moral judgement they will always be motivated by it. However, as 
Stocker has points out, people suffering from depression can find themselves completely 
lacking in motivation to do what they think is right (1978 p.744). An internalist that is 
committed to an unbreakable connection between moral judgement and motivation will be 
forced to say that people in this situation are not making sincere moral judgements. This 
seems an implausible way of characterising people with depression. As Stocker makes 
clear, when someone is suffering from depression they are not prevented from classing 
things as right or wrong in the way they did previously. Their problem is in transforming 
these judgements into action (1978 p.744). As a result it seems reasonable to think that 
proposing a connection that claims that everyone who makes a moral judgement will 
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always be motivated to act in line with that judgement is too strong. 
Weaker8 versions of internalism have sought to propose a necessary connection between 
moral judgements and motivation that is able to accommodate cases where the connection 
breaks down. These cases are typically dealt with by a rationality clause9. Moral 
judgements are said to motivate necessarily when the agent is practically rational. This 
approach passes the explanatory work onto the concept of practical rationality and so raises 
the question of what is meant by this. We can distinguish between two forms of rationality: 
practical rationality, concerned with what we should do and theoretical rationality, 
concerned with what we should believe (Holton 2009 p.175). Practical rationality governs 
our intentions or plans about what to do (Harman 1999 p.13). To be practically rational is 
to have intentions that are compatible with the agent's desires and evaluative judgements 
(Wallace 2009). The rationality clause advocated by internalists holds that to fail to 
transform moral judgements into a motivation to act involves a failure of practical 
rationality. One form of practically irrationality involves possessing intentions which are 
not coherent with one's desires and value judgements. Another form of practical 
irrationality is failing to intend to do what you judge to be the best means to your ends. By 
invoking a rationality clause this form of internalism is able to accommodate the cases 
where people fail to be motivated by their moral judgements while maintaining the 
existence of a necessary connection. On this view, being motivated by your moral 
judgements is a necessary condition for practical rationality.
The next issue to investigate about the internalist thesis concerns the level of motivation 
being proposed. Internalists claim that moral judgements motivate. We can understand this 
to mean that moral judgements will motivate all the way to action. We can also understand 
it to mean that someone who makes a moral judgement will be motivated but not 
necessarily motivated enough to act in line with the judgement10. Suppose Dave has just 
8David Brink (1989 p.40-41) was the first to make the distinction between 'strong' internalism and 'weak' 
internalism.
9 Wedgewood (2007 p.25) and Smith (1994 p. 61) deal with the problem in this way.
10 Mason characterises this distinction as being between “Weak internalism” and “Weakest internalism” 
(2008 p.143-144).
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enough money to pay his rent. Dave could sincerely judge that it would be good to give his 
money to Oxfam to help the hungry and also judge that he should pay his rent. Someone in 
this situation may be motivated to give money to Oxfam but find that this motivation is 
greatly outweighed by his motivation to pay his rent to avoid all the unpleasant 
consequences that might occur should he fail to do so. The necessary connection is
 maintained as the agent in this case is motivated to act in line with his judgement, its just 
that this motivation is not strong enough to lead to action. We might think that this form of 
internalism offers a way of meeting the challenge of supererogation. When someone judges 
that a possible way of acting is supererogatory they may have some motivation to act in 
line with this judgement however this motivation may well be overruled by other reasons 
that recommend against acting in such a way. In other words, judging that something is 
supererogatory will lead to some motivation to act in line with this judgement, however 
small that motivation may be. This form of internalism allows us to explain why we would 
not expect the connection between moral judgements and motivation to hold for 
supererogatory judgements.
To evaluate whether this form of internalism is plausible we must distinguish between two 
levels of reason and how these two types of reason relate to motivation. Dancy 
distinguishes between all things considered reasons11 and “contributory reasons” 12(2004 
p.17). A contributory reason for action is one that counts in favour of acting a certain way 
while an all things considered reason concerns what we should do after we have weighed 
up all the relevant reasons. The question that this raises for internalism is whether the 
theory applies to judgements concerning contributory reasons, all things considered 
reasons or both. If the theory applies to contributory reasons then every reason that an 
agent judges to count in favour of action will be expected to motivate to some extent. The 
above solution to the challenge supererogation poses to internalism is a contributory 
reasons internalism. An all things considered reasons internalism would only apply to 
11 Dancy uses the term 'overall ought'. However, In a forthcoming paper Ridge and Chrisman (in progress) 
raise a number of concerns about the use of the word 'ought' when what is meant is 'must'. In light of these 
worries it seems that Dancy's use of 'ought' may be misplaced. In order to remain neutral on this topic I refer 
to 'all things considered reasons' rather than 'overall oughts'.
12 As Dancy notes the term “pro tanto” (meaning at “as far as that goes”) is often used in relation to this 
concept (2004 p.17). I will follow Dancy in referring to this concept in terms of 'contributory' rather than 
'pro tanto' reasons.
Page 19 of 47
 
judgements that agents make about the way they ought to act once everything has been 
taken into account13. We can make this distinction clearer by looking at how it applies to 
the example of Dave. Dave judges that he does have good reason to give to Oxfam as to do 
so may well result in a life being saved. This is a contributory reason. However, he judges 
that when he takes all the reasons he has into account he ought to pay his rent. The 
question we must ask of internalism is whether a complete lack of motivation on Dave's 
part to give money to Oxfam would show that Dave is practically irrational. 
I see no reason to think that someone in the above situation who lacks any desire to give 
money to Oxfam is practically irrational. As Dancy argues, someone who has no 
motivation to act in line with a contributory reason that is greatly outweighed by other 
reasons does not seem to be guilty of any failure in practical rationality (2004 p.22). It 
seems odd indeed to think that lacking any motivational pull towards giving money to 
Oxfam would display a lack of rationality. As a result, the necessary connection between 
moral judgements and motivation should be restricted to judgements about all things 
considered reasons. The necessary connection can be formulated in the following way: If 
someone judges that an act, ɸ, is what they have most reason to do then they will either be 
motivated to ɸ or be practically irrational. 
Restricting the necessary connection to judgements about all things considered reasons 
allows the internalist to explain why there is a reliable connection between judgements of 
moral obligation and motivation. In the last chapter we said that if someone judges that 
they have a moral obligation to perform a particular act then they are judging that this act 
is what they have most reason to do. This explains why there is a reliable connection 
between judgements of moral obligation and motivation.  
This form of internalism is also able to explain why there is no reliable connection between 
judgements of supererogation and motivation. Judging that an act is supererogatory 
13 Wedgewood (2007) defends an internalism about “all things considered” . 
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involves judging that there is a moral reason to perform that act. Knowing that someone 
has judged that an act is supererogatory will not by itself give us any indication of whether 
that person judges that this way of acting is the way they have most reason to act once 
everything has been taken into account. This will depend upon the costs and benefits 
involved in performing this act over another and the level of importance the agent places in 
performing morally praiseworthy acts. Someone could judge that an act is supererogatory 
and judge that it is what they have most reason to do. Equally people can judge that 
something is supererogatory and judge that it is not what they have most reason to do. This 
form of internalism is well placed to explain the lack of a reliable connection between 
judgements of supererogation and motivation. If there is a necessary connection between 
judgements about what there is most reason to do and motivation then a group of 
judgements that will sometimes be what there is most reason to do and not at other times 
will not be reliably connected to motivation. This form of internalism is able to account for 
the existence of a reliable connection between judgements of moral obligation and 
motivation and the lack of such a connection for judgements of supererogation.
As it stands this account gives us an unsatisfying explanation of how a judgement of 
supererogation may motivate someone to action. So far we have said that if someone 
judges that acting a certain way is what they have most reason to do then this will motivate 
them to action. This allows us to say the following about supererogatory judgements: if 
someone judges that a possible act is supererogatory and what they have most reason to do 
then this judgement should motivate. As it stands, the judgement of supererogation adds 
nothing to our understanding of why someone would choose to act this way. Unless we can 
explain how judgements of supererogation are capable of influencing our judgement of 
what there is most reason to do then we will lack an account of how these judgements 
could lead to action. We might think that one way to explain this is to argue that because 
judging something is supererogatory involves a judgement that that way of acting is 
morally valuable this gives us reason to act in this way. This would explain how 
judgements of supererogation can alter what we judge to be the balance of reasons. 
However, this account assumes the truth of internalism the internalist claim that judging an 
act to be morally valuable involves judging that there is reason to perform it. Given that 
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this paper is concerned with evaluating internalism about different sorts of moral 
judgement in the hope of shedding new light on the debate between internalists and 
externalists we cannot defend internalism for judgements of supererogation by appealing to 
internalism. Another approach would be to posit a necessary connection between 
judgements of supererogation and a pro-attitude that falls short of motivation. This would 
allow for an internal but defeasible connection between judgements of supererogation and 
motivation. Internalists need to give such an account as the alternatives are either an 
explanation that is external to the judgement or one that gives no role to the judgement. To 
give such an account we must first find a pro-attitude that is able to play this role.
In order to consider what the most plausible candidate for this attitude could be we should 
consider the attitude we would usually expect people to have if they have made this type of 
judgement. The  obvious candidate for this attitude is 'admiration'14. Jollimore argues that 
admiration is a pro-attitude we have towards people who we feel have achieved something 
that is “both worthy and difficult” (2006 p.159). This makes an important point about the 
concept  of admiration. We only feel admiration towards people if they have acted in a way 
that we find valuable. A military general may admire the ingenuity of a scientist who 
creates a new weapon but a pacifist will not. In addition we will only admire people if their 
achievements are not easy to obtain. This may be because it takes hard work or particular 
skills to achieve what they did (Jollimore 2006 p.160). 
When people describe someone as a saint or a hero we would expect them to feel 
admiration towards that person. It would seem strange for someone to say that an action is 
beyond the call of duty and feel no admiration toward people who would perform the act. 
We would question the sincerity of the judgement in such a case. We can formulate the 
necessary connection between judgements of supererogation and admiration in the 
following way: If someone judges that an act, ɸ, is supererogatory then they will either feel 
admiration towards those who ɸ or they are irrational15. We can explain this connection by 
14 Robert Audi also links supererogation with admiration. He claims that supererogatory ideals are 
“admirable to fulfil even though we are not criticizable for not doing so.” (2005 p.135) 
15 This assumes that emotions can be assessed in terms of rationality. For an argument to support such a 
view see Provis (1981). 
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saying that these feelings are part of the content of supererogatory judgements. Part of 
what it is to sincerely judge that someone has acted in a supererogatory way is to feel 
admiration for that person's moral commitment. For this connection to be plausible it must 
be the case that feelings of admiration are always compatible with judgements of 
supererogation. In the remainder of this chapter I will respond to some problems that might 
be raised against this compatibility. In order for this connection to enable internalism to 
explain how judgements of supererogation can motivate an explanation is needed of how 
feelings of admiration are capable of motivating. This account will be given in the next 
chapter. 
One problem that could be raised against this account is that it doesn't fit with the 
testimony of people who perform acts of supererogation. The reaction of Autrey and two 
other men who have performed similar heroic acts on the New York subway in recent years 
supports this claim. As the New York Times reported in 2010, Autrey, Chad Lindsay and an 
unidentified man all decided to walk straight out of the subway station after jumping on the 
tracks to save a life (Daly 2010). That all of these men decided to leave promptly after their 
acts suggests that they did not consider themselves worthy of admiration. If this had been 
the reason for their actions then it is reasonable to think that they would have stayed to 
receive the acclaim that they would have received. The fact that those who perform acts of 
supererogation often seem not to be interested in admiration might be thought to be 
evidence against the claim that there is a necessary connection between judgements of 
supererogation and admiration. 
However, this line of criticism does not highlight a genuine problem for the claim that 
there is a necessary connection between moral judgements and admiration. We can accept 
that many people who perform acts of supererogation have no interest in gaining the 
admiration of others and continue to hold that such a connection exists. As Heyd points 
out, we can think that an agent has performed an act of supererogation even if the agent 
denies this (2006). After all people who perform acts that many people would consider 
supererogatory often claim to have only done their duty.  In their study of moral exemplars 
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Colby and Damon observed that people who dedicate their lives to moral causes often feel 
that they are obliged to do so (1992 p.70). For example, Suzie Valdez, who has dedicated 
her life to feeding the poor of Ciudad Juarez, made it clear to Colby and Damon that she 
felt she had to help in this way (1992 p.45). Similarly the civil rights activist Virginia Durr 
claimed that when it came to considering whether or not to dedicate her life to this cause 
“there were no choices to make” (1992 p.70). The agent could simply be mistaken in their 
judgement. They may also simply be being modest in claiming that they were only doing 
their duty. (Heyd 2006). If the agent is not interested in admiration then this may simply be 
because they do not judge that they have acted in a supererogatory way. 
There are two further problems that may be raised against the connection between 
judgements of supererogation and admiration. The first problem relates to the balance of 
reasons. As we said earlier, someone who acts in a way that we judge to be supererogatory 
may have been acting against what we judge that they have most reason to do. It seems odd 
to feel admiration for someone who has acted against the balance of reasons. To defend the 
claim of a necessary connection between judgements of supererogation and feelings of 
admiration, the account of admiration must explain how people can admire those they 
judge to be acting against their best interests.
The second problem concerns the relationship between admiration and emulation. Feeling 
admiration for someone is often claimed to be capable of motivating people to emulate 
those they admire. However, not all judgements of supererogation will motivate the agent 
to emulate the act. This by itself is not too great a problem as this could be explained in 
terms of conflicting motivation. What is more of a problem is that it also seems possible to 
judge that someone has acted in a supererogatory way and feel no desire at all to emulate 
that person. To solve this problem we require an account of admiration that explains the 
existence of a defeasible connection between admiration and emulation.
In order to solve both these problems then we will need to examine how feelings of 
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admiration can lead to action. These two problems provide constraints on the account that 
can be given of admiration in order for it to be compatible with judgements of 
supererogation. The account of admiration will need to explain how it is possible to judge 
that someone has acted against their best interests and admire them. It will also need to 
explain the defeasible connection between feelings of admiration and emulation. The next 
chapter of this thesis will attempt to provide such an account. 
In the first half of this chapter I looked at ways in which we could formulate the necessary 
connection between moral judgements and motivation in such a way that is compatible 
with the existence of a reliable connection between judgements of moral obligation but not 
judgements of supererogation. I argued that this can be achieved by restricting the 
necessary connection to overall judgements, judgements about what to do once everything 
has been taken into account. This successfully explains why there is a reliable connection 
between judgements of moral obligation and motivation but not for judgements of 
supererogation. However, as it stands this account is unable to explain the motivational 
power of judgements of supererogation. In order to do this an explanation needs to be 
given of how judgements of supererogation can influence our judgements concerning what 
there is most reason to do. I have argued that this can be achieved by positing the existence 
of a necessary connection between judgements of supererogation and a pro-attitude that 
falls short of motivation. I proposed  'admiration' as a plausible candidate for this pro-
attitude. In the remainder of this chapter I have defended the existence of a necessary 
connection between judgements of supererogation and feelings of admiration against 
problems that could be raised against the compatibility of the two. In the next chapter I will 
investigate how feelings of admiration are capable of motivating. 
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Chapter 3 – How do feelings of admiration lead to action?
In the last chapter I argued that there is a necessary connection between judgements of 
supererogation and feelings of admiration. I then responded to various ways in which it 
could be argued that feelings of admiration are not always compatible with such 
judgements. In the first chapter we found that judgements of supererogation are capable of 
motivating. An internalist account of supererogation must explain how feelings of 
admiration are capable of motivating. In the last chapter I noted two constraints for such an 
account. First, the concept of admiration must be able to explain the existence of a 
defeasible connection between feelings of admiration for someone and a desire to emulate 
them. The concept of admiration must also allow us to find someone admirable even if 
they have acted against what they have most reason to do. This chapter will investigate 
how these feelings are capable of motivating someone to action and respond to problems 
that could be raised against this account. I will argue that feelings of admiration are able to 
bring to the fore the right-making features of an action and that this is capable of changing 
our judgement of what there is most reason to do. 
 
It is claimed that admiration is linked to emulation. In his Theory of the Moral Sentiments 
Adam Smith argues that, “the love and admiration that we naturally conceive for those 
whose character and conduct we approve of, naturally disposes us to desire to become 
ourselves the objects of like agreeable sentiments” (2007 p.114). Admiring someone often 
brings about a desire to be more like them. Admiring the discipline of a hard working 
colleague may lead me to a desire to work as hard as them. We might think that a 
disposition to emulate is a necessary part of feelings of admiration. On this account, to feel 
admiration for someone who has performed a supererogatory act would involve a wish to 
emulate them. We can have this desire to emulate someone's behaviour even if we think 
that we are unlikely to get the chance to perform a similar act. Most people do not get the 
chance to act heroically but this does not prevent them from hoping that if given the chance 
they would act in a similar way to those they find admirable. This desire is also compatible 
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with a complete lack of confidence in our ability to actually perform heroic acts. 
This account of admiration is able to explain why feelings of admiration may lead someone 
to action. If admiring someone involves a disposition to emulate the person who performed 
the act then we can see why these judgements may motivate someone to action. The 
account also manages to make the connection defeasible. By connecting admiration to a 
disposition to emulate the account leaves open the possibility that for any individual case 
of admiration we may not in fact have a desire to emulate the person we admire. This is 
important as judging something is supererogatory will not always motivate. Our account of 
admiration then, should not claim that people will always be motivated to act on these 
feelings.
However, I think there is good reason to think that this account posits too strong a 
connection between admiration and emulation. We may find someone admirable without 
being disposed in any way to emulate their behaviour. For example, someone who agrees 
with Susan Wolf's argument (1982 p.419-439) that we should not try to emulate moral 
saints may feel no desire to act like a saint. This does not rule out the possibility that this 
person feels admiration towards those who are saints. In this case there could be 
admiration without any disposition to emulate. This problem ties in with the second 
condition that the account of admiration must meet, that admiration is compatible with 
judging that someone has acted against what they have most reason to do. If we judge that 
someone has acted against what they have most reason to do then presumably we would 
not be disposed to emulate that person. Linking admiration with a disposition to emulate 
seems unable to provide an account of admiration capable of meeting the conditions we set 
out at the start of the chapter. 
By itself this does not give us reason to reject this account of how feelings of admiration 
can motivate. At the start of the chapter I argued that in order for the claim that there exists 
a necessary connection between judgements of supererogation and admiration to fit with 
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our account of supererogation a plausible account of admiration must be given that meets 
two conditions. The above account may fail to meet these conditions but that does not 
mean that the account is wrong. Rather it means that it is incompatible with the existence 
of a necessary connection between judgements of supererogation and feelings of 
admiration. In order to defend the claim that such a connection exists we will need to find 
an independent reason to think that a plausible account of admiration should be capable of 
meeting these conditions.
To do so, let's consider an example of non-moral admiration. Mark and Peter are brothers 
who have run marathons together since they were teenagers. Mark runs marathons for a 
hobby. He always manages to complete the race but never comes close to winning. Mark 
has to make some sacrifices for his hobby. He has to get up early to train before work. 
Sometimes he has to miss out on social occasions if they are the night before a race. 
However, these sacrifices do not prevent Mark from leading a well-rounded life. Mark has 
a family and close friends who he sees regularly. He likes reading, watching films and 
going to art galleries. Mark's brother, Peter, is a competitive marathon runner and often 
manages to win. The sacrifices that Peter makes often lead him to miss important family 
and social occasions. As a result, Peter struggles to form lasting relationships with people. 
He is always too tired from training to enjoy books or films and never has time to go to an 
art gallery. Whenever Peter wins a race Mark is full of admiration for him. He knows how 
hard Peter has to work to achieve what he does and finds this dedication admirable. 
Nevertheless, Mark has no desire to emulate Peter. He would not be willing to give up his 
enjoyment of books and films nor would he wish to sacrifice his trips to art galleries. 
Indeed, Mark thinks that, on the balance of reasons, Peter should not prioritise marathon 
running over anything else. He thinks that Mark would be happier if he were able to 
commit to a long term relationship, develop more meaningful friendships and appreciate 
culture, yet he still finds his dedication admirable. If we accept that Mark does feels 
admiration for Peter in the above example then we have reason to think that it is possible to 
admire someone without feeling any desire to emulate them. We may also admire someone 
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who we think has acted against what we judge they had most reason to do. 
To defend the claim that admiration involves a disposition to emulate we would need to 
deny that Mark genuinely admires his brother in this example. In the same way that 
internalists claimed that a moral judgement that is not connected to motivation is not 
genuine, perhaps we could argue that without a disposition to emulate there is no genuine 
feeling of admiration. This strikes me as an unreasonable claim to make. In the same way 
that Mark can admire Peter without being disposed to emulate him, a football supporter 
who attends the occasional game may admire the dedication of the fan who goes every 
week without in any way being disposed to emulate him. Further evidence of this claim 
can be found in a recent social psychology study that found that while feelings of 
admiration are capable of motivating, they often fail to do so. Feelings of admiration were 
found to be much less likely to motivate than feelings of benign envy (van de Ven et al 
2011). If a necessary connection between admiration and emulation existed then feelings of 
admiration would motivate more reliably than the results of the study suggest they do. 
There does not seem to be any good reason to think that for someone to have a genuine 
feeling of admiration they must be disposed to emulate the person they admire. 
Nevertheless, we should not lose sight of the fact that admiration is capable of leading to 
motivation. If we reject the existence of a necessary connection between the two concepts 
we should give an alternative account that can explain how feelings of admiration can lead 
to motivation. Such an explanation can be found by looking again at Jollimore's claim that 
finding someone admirable involves perceiving her achievements to be valuable in some 
way (2006 p.159). Valuing someone's achievements could motivate us to try to emulate 
them, assuming of course that we do not judge that they are beyond our abilities. As van 
der Burg and Taekema point out, recognising that someone embodies ideals we hold to be 
valuable can inspire us to try to be like them with respect to that ideal (2004 p.94). Feeling 
admiration for someone who embodies a particular ideal strengthens our attachment to an 
ideal. These ideals may or may not be ones that were already recognised as valuable by the 
agent. Admiring someone for a particular character trait may change what we judge the 
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balance of reasons to be. They can do this by bringing to the fore the right-making features 
of an action. This can increase the importance the agent gives to them or recognise the 
importance of these features for the first time. Someone who values marathon running may 
want to devote their time to training for marathons. This desire may well increase if they 
were to meet someone like Peter who embodies the ideal of the devoted athlete. Equally 
someone who had no previous interest in marathon running may recognise the value of this 
ideal and be moved to embody it. Admiring someone can lead to a new or strengthened 
desire to act like that person in respect to that ideal. 
However, we are only likely to have this desire if it does not clash with achieving other 
things that we value. While Mark admires Peter's achievements at marathons he does not 
want to emulate him as this would mean sacrificing too much of what he holds valuable. If 
Mark's priorities change and he decides that what he wants most is to win a marathon then 
Mark's feeling of admiration for his brother may well lead to him having a desire to 
emulate him. Feelings of admiration are only likely to lead to a desire to emulate if we 
judge that this would bring about more value than what we would need to sacrifice in order 
to secure it. This may seem to leave the concept of admiration out of the motivational 
picture. If we already had most reason to act in a certain way then our admiration for 
someone plays no part in motivating us to act in a similar way. 
We must remember, though, that feelings of admiration are capable of providing us with a 
new or strengthened desire to emulate the person we admire in respect to certain ideals. 
This will provide an additional or strengthened reason to emulate the person we admire. 
Feelings of admiration can change our judgements concerning what there is most reason to 
do. Someone with a strengthened desire to pursue athletic achievement may judge that this 
is what they have most reason to do when previously they judged that they had more 
reason to pursue other interests. Equally though the strengthened desire may not be strong 
enough to alter judgements about the balance of reasons. This will depend on our previous 
judgement of the balance of reasons and the strength of this new desire. A strengthened 
desire to dedicate oneself to marathon running may still lack the strength required to make 
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it appear to be what there is most reason to do. 
Let's sum up what has been said so far about admiration. Feelings of admiration may lead 
to a new or strengthened desire to emulate. This desire is capable of changing our 
judgement of what is favoured by the balance of reasons. While there is no necessary 
connection between feelings of admiration and a desire to emulate, feelings of admiration 
are capable of changing our judgements about what there is most reason to do. So far we 
have focussed on situations where an appraiser judges someone else to have acted in a 
supererogatory way. In order to explain the motivational power of these judgements we 
must also explain how someone who judges that a possible way of acting open to them is 
supererogatory could be motivated by this judgement. To relate what we have said so far to 
first person supererogation judgements, when we judge that someone has performed a 
supererogatory act we feel admiration towards the agent. However, when the act has not 
yet been performed it is less clear who is being admired. In first person judgements of 
supererogation it seems reasonable to think that our admiration is not toward any particular 
person but towards the type of person who would perform such an act. Judging that a way 
of acting open to us is supererogatory involves feelings of admiration to people who would 
perform that act or who have performed an equivalent or similar act in the past. This 
admiration may lead us to reassess our judgement concerning what is supported by the 
balance of reasons. If our new assessment of the balance of reasons supports performing 
the supererogatory act then we will be motivated to perform it so long as we are rational.
On this account we can admire someone who dedicates themselves to fulfilling a particular 
ideal and also judge that in doing so they sacrifice more value than they gain. This means 
that we can admire someone who we judge to have acted against what we believe they 
have most reason to do. This may strike some as problematic, it is one thing to admire 
someone who is acting in a way you judge to be against what you have reason to do and 
another to judge that someone is admirable when they have acted against what they have 
most reason to do. To act against what there is most reason to do leaves one open to the 
charge of irrationality. This account needs either to explain how we can admire those we 
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think are irrational or to deny that acting against the balance of reasons is irrational. There 
does seem to be something strange in admiring people as a result of actions that you deem 
irrational. For example, suppose Peter were to claim that he gets no pleasure or satisfaction 
out of running marathons and saw no reason to continue to devote his time to them. 
Despite this Peter continues to run marathons. In this case the irrationality of Peter's 
dedication would make it very hard to continue to admire him. Denying that it is always 
irrational to act against the balance of reasons seem like a more promising solution to this 
problem. Clearly many cases where we act against the balance of reasons will be irrational. 
To mount a defence of this sort we will need to outline the situations in which it can be 
acceptable to act against the balance of reasons. 
While it may at first seem contradictory to think that someone who has acted against the 
balance of reasons is not irrational, this point becomes persuasive when we distinguish 
between the reasons an agent has for acting and the reasons they believe they have. As 
Broome points out, someone may have no knowledge of reasons that count in favour of 
them acting a certain way (2007 p.352). For example, I may judge that what I have most 
reason to do is to take the train as I know that this is the quickest way for me to get to 
work. Unknown to me though, the train drivers have gone on strike and choosing to take 
the train rather than the bus will make me late. In this case although I have most reason to 
take the bus, it is not irrational for me to choose to take the train. From the point of view of 
an informed observer assessing my rationality, I have acted against what I have most 
reason to do although I have not acted against what I believe to be favoured by the balance 
of reasons. The fact that we judge someone to have acted against what we believe they 
have most reason to do does not give us reason to call her irrational. One way in which it 
can be rationally blameless to act against what there is most reason to do is if the agent had 
no knowledge of the reasons counting against her action.
Although Broome's point gives us good reason to think that acting against the balance of 
reasons is not irrational, we might still think that it would be odd to admire someone in this 
situation. We might think them to be rationally blameless but there would seem to be no 
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reason to feel admiration for such a person. This defence will fail if we cannot explain why 
it is possible to admire someone who you judge to have acted against the balance of 
reasons. 
Such an explanation can be found in Owen Flanagan's paper 'Admirable Immorality and 
Admirable Imperfection'. Flanagan argues that we can admire a particular character trait 
possessed by an individual without admiring the person as a whole (1986 p.43). Flanagan 
supports this claim by giving the example of Gauguin whose commitment to his art saw 
him abandon his family to travel to the South Pacific16 (1986 p.43). Flanagan argues that 
among the different responses people have to this example is a feeling that Gauguin acted 
in a way that was both admirable and morally imperfect (1986 p.44). Our admiration for 
Gauguin's commitment to art is compatible with judging that the abandonment of his 
family was morally imperfect. Flanagan uses his claim that we can admire an individual 
trait without admiring the person as a whole to support the idea that admirable moral 
imperfection is possible (1986 p.52). We can apply this argument to the idea that we can 
admire those who act against what we judge they have most reason to do. We can judge 
that someone has acted against the balance of reason and still admire certain character 
traits that are necessary for that person to act in that way. This does not mean that we 
admire them for their decision-making powers. Mark can admire the dedication to sporting 
achievement that allows Peter to win marathons while holding that Peter's judgement of 
what he has most reason to do is flawed. Just as we can consider Gauguin's act to be 
admirable but morally imperfect, we might think that Peter's commitment is admirable yet 
goes against what he has most reason to do. It is possible then to feel admiration for some 
aspects of a person's character while not admiring every part of that character. In cases of 
supererogation we may admire someone's moral commitment while feeling that their 
judgement of what is supported by the balance of reasons leaves room for improvement. 
This might give us reason to think that admiration is entirely frame dependent. In other 
words, we might think that it is always possible to admire a particular character trait 
regardless of how we feel about the character as a whole. We should note though that 
16 This example was first used by Bernard Williams (1981 pp.20-39 ). 
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Flanagan's point is not designed to make admiration compatible with all levels of 
immorality. Flanagan argues that: “Admiration for particular character traits is invariably 
conditional,” (1986 p.43) and that our admiration depends on, “the assumption that they 
are moderated by other devotions and sensitivities within the psychological economy of a 
whole character.” (1986 p.43). In other words, our admiration for a particular character 
trait does depend to some extent upon the person's overall character. In some cases the 
repellent nature of someone's overall character may prevent us from admiring any 
individual trait. So, we can admire Gauguin's commitment to art while we judge that 
abandoning his family was morally imperfect but we would not admire Gauguin's 
commitment to art if he had murdered his family rather than abandon them. Admiration is 
not entirely frame dependent then, as there may be cases where the distaste we feel for the 
character as a whole prevents us from admiring an individual trait. 
We have said that it is possible to admire those we judge to have acted against what they 
have most reason to do providing they have acted in line with what they believe to be the 
balance of reasons. This allows us to maintain that feelings of admiration are a part of 
judgements of supererogation and that supererogation is compatible with acting against the 
balance of reasons. Perhaps though we can admire people even if they act against what 
they judge they have most reason to do.  As Arpaly argues, there are some cases where 
acting against one's judgement of what is supported by the balance of reasons is less 
irrational than acting in accordance with this judgement (2000 p.491). Arpaly gives a 
number of examples to support this claim. One of these examples concerns a student who 
has always been convinced that she wants to complete a chemistry Ph.D. (2000 p.504). 
This conviction is maintained despite the fact that a year into the degree she has found the 
process frustrating and beyond her abilities. The student judges that staying on the course 
is what she has most reason to do, ignoring the reasons that speak against doing so and the 
fact that like many people she is reluctant to give up long held goals. However, one day her 
frustration becomes too much for her and she quits the course, cursing her irrationality as 
she does so. Arpaly argues that while the student is not acting in an ideally rational way it 
is more rational for her to act as she did than to continue her studies (2000 p.504). Her 
decision was was made in response to good reasons. The student acted in response to these 
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reasons even if she was not fully aware that she was doing so (Arpaly 2000 p.505). 
Looking back on her decision many years later, after a successful career, the student may 
judge that her instincts were better at tracking her reasons than her judgement.
I think that we would be able to admire someone who has acted against their judgement of 
the balance of reasons in a similar way. We would only be able to do so if we judge that 
they way they have acted is in line with what we judge the agent has most reason to do. 
Suppose Rex is a young and impressionable philosophy student who becomes convinced 
by rational egoism, the claim that the most rational thing for an agent to do in any situation 
is that which maximises his self-interest, after attending a lecture on the subject. This 
conviction does not represent a lasting commitment on Rex's part, he will abandon it when 
he attends the next week's lecture on problems associated with the position. Now lets 
imagine that Rex finds himself in a situation where he can save the life of his friend, 
Fraser. In doing so Rex would break his own leg. Rex has many friends and his friendship 
with Fraser is not a particularly close one. Although Rex would miss Fraser were he to die, 
he judges that this pain is far outweighed by the pain of a broken leg. Rex judges that the 
rational thing for him to do here is not to save Fraser, as this is unlikely to maximise his 
self-interest. Suppose though that Rex acts against this judgement and opts to save his 
friend's life at the expense of suffering a broken leg, he then finds himself troubled by this 
irrationality. However, after attending his next lecture (after a remarkable recovery) and 
changing his opinion on rational egoism he decides that the way he acted was rationally 
preferable to acting in line with his judgement. I think in this case if we judge that this 
action is supererogatory we would feel admiration for Rex, even though he has acted 
against what he judges to be the balance of reasons.
There is though, one constraint on admiring those who have acted against what they judge 
to be their best interests. We would not be able to do so if they acted against what we 
judged them to have most reason to do. In the case of Rex, we are able to admire him so 
long as we are not ourselves rational egoists. If we were convinced rational egoists then we 
would not think that Rex's instincts tracked his reasons better than his judgements. In 
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certain situations then we can admire someone if they have acted against what we judge to 
be the balance of reasons or even what they judge to be the balance of reasons. However, 
we would not admire someone who acted against both our judgement and their judgement 
of the balance of reasons, at least when this seems clear to both us and the agent.
However, even if we accept that acting against one's judgement of what there is most 
reason to do may be more rational than acting in line with it this might still be seen to be 
irrational. After all, a more rational agent would accept that their judgement about what 
there is most reason to do is flawed before acting against it. While this may be true it only 
gives us reason to think that the act is irrational if we accept a view of rationality that holds 
that it is always rationally blameworthy to fail to act in an ideally rational way. However, 
as Slote argues, a view that holds that rational imperfection is not always blameworthy is 
more in keeping with our pre-theoretical intuitions about the concept (1989 p.4). To avoid 
the charge of irrationality it is often enough to satisfy some basic requirements of 
rationality rather than to act in the most rational way possible (1989 p.30). Accepting this 
view of rationality allows us to say that although those who act against their best interest 
are not completely rational they do not deserve to be called irrational. We can reserve this 
criticism for those who make a clear breach of what is demanded by rationality. In 
situations where someone is irrational in this sense then, as I pointed out earlier, we will 
find it difficult to admire her. This allows us to say that admiration is compatible with 
imperfect rationality up to the point at which it becomes blameworthy. While it may seem 
odd to admire someone who is rationally imperfect we should bear in mind that we are not 
admiring her for this imperfection but despite it.
This clashes slightly with what has so far been said about supererogation. If we think that 
admiration is not possible when someone has acted irrationally then by the account of 
supererogation we currently have we will not be able to say that such a person is 
performing a supererogatory act. It could be argued that this creates a problem as there 
may exist cases where someone has acted in a way that goes completely against the 
balance of reason but also in a morally praiseworthy way that goes beyond what could 
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reasonably be demanded by other members of the moral community. For example, suppose 
someone jumped in front of a train not to save a life but to save a child's favourite toy from 
being destroyed. Saving a child's toy certainly seems like a morally praiseworthy act. It is 
also an act that no one could be blamed for not performing. It seems then like it meets all 
the criteria necessary for it to be called a supererogatory act. However, given the balance 
between what is gained from such an act and what is risked it seems like this act is 
irrational. While the loss of a toy to a child is preferably avoided it is not worth risking you 
life for. If the account of admiration I have given is correct then this will be a very difficult 
act to admire given how irrational it seems to be. This would raise a problem for the 
connection I have proposed between acts of supererogation and feelings of admiration. 
I do not think that this example causes too many problems for the connection between 
supererogation and feelings of admiration that I have suggested. As Curtis argues, someone 
who performs a morally valuable act when the moral value is far outweighed by the risks 
or costs incurred by the agent, performs a foolish act not a supererogatory one (1981 
p.314). This strikes me as a reasonable thing to say, as a natural reaction to someone who 
acted in such a way would be one of disbelief not praise. As with admiration then, 
judgements of supererogation are compatible with judging that someone has acted against 
what they have most reason to do but there comes a point where the balance of reasons is 
weighed so heavily against the action that we can no longer think of it as supererogatory. 
This requires a slight amendment to the account of supererogation given in the first 
chapter. For an act to be supererogatory the costs or risks to the agent must not outweigh 
the benefits likely to arise from the act to such a great extent that the act becomes foolish. 
We might think this account of how feelings of admiration can lead to motivation is 
incompatible with what was said about supererogation and obligation in chapter one for a 
different reason. My account of the two types of judgement claimed that to judge that 
something is morally obligatory involves judging that it is what you have most reason to 
do while this is not the case for judgements of supererogation. Given this, it seems odd to 
account for the ability of judgements of supererogation to motivate by claiming that they 
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will do so if the agent judges that this is what she has most reason to do. If judging that 
something is supererogatory does not involve judging that it is what we have most reason 
to do then it seems that this account rules out the possibility that judgements of 
supererogation may motivate.
However, this objection misrepresents what was said about judgements of moral obligation 
and supererogation in an important way. The account of judgements of supererogation in 
the first chapter claimed that, unlike judgements of moral obligation, judging an act to be 
supererogatory does not necessarily involve a judgement that this act is what there is most 
reason to do. This does not rule out the possibility that what we judge to be supererogatory 
may also be what we judge we have most reason to do. The account of moral obligation 
that I endorsed linked the concept to moral accountability. Judging an act to be morally 
obligatory involves judging that it would be blameworthy not to perform it. This means 
that in order for an act to be morally obligatory it must be what we judge we have most 
reason to do. It does not mean that if an act is judged to be what we have most reason to do 
then that act is morally obligatory. That depends on whether or not performing the act 
would make us appropriate subjects of blame. It is possible to judge that an act is what you 
have most reason to do without judging that you would be a fitting subject of blame if you 
failed to perform it. There is then, no incompatibility between judging that something is 
supererogatory and judging that it is what you have most reason to do.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that this account of how feelings of admiration leaves 
judgements of supererogation playing a very similar motivational role to judgements of 
obligation. In first person judgements of supererogation (where the agent is also the 
appraiser) if the agent judges that a supererogatory act is clearly and decisively against the 
balance of reasons then she wouldn't feel admiration for someone in her position who acted 
in that way. Alternatively, if the agent judged that the act was clearly what there was most 
reason to do then she would judge someone in her situation irrational if they failed to 
perform it. The surprising conclusion is that in cases of first person supererogatory 
judgements where the agent is convinced that the balance of reasons is clear in what it 
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supports, judgements of supererogation will either be irrational or they will be motivating. 
This leaves judgements of supererogation playing a very similar role to judgements of 
obligation which we said will motivate when the agent is rational. We might think that in 
trying to explain how judgements of supererogation can motivate we have ended up 
making the concept redundant.
This objection makes an interesting point about the similarity between these two kinds of 
judgements in cases where the agent judges the balance of reasons to clearly favour a 
particular course of action. It is important to note the limits of this similarity though. The 
first limit is an obvious one but is worth mentioning for the sake of clarity. While there 
might be similarities in rational blameworthiness in situations where the balance of reasons 
are clear, this similarity does not extend to moral blameworthiness. We may be rationally 
blameworthy for failing to perform an act of supererogation that we judge was supported 
by the balance of reasons but we would not be morally blameworthy. A more important 
limit is that there will be cases in which the balance of reasons may support two acts to an 
equal degree. In such cases we can judge an act to be supererogatory, supported by the 
balance of reasons and not irrational to remain unmotivated by. A further limit is imposed 
by our status as fallible agents without access to all the relevant information about the 
balance of reasons. This means that we will often find ourselves in situations where we are 
unsure about the balance of reasons. Indeed, Kawall argues that even fully informed, ideal 
observers may disagree about whether or not an act is supererogatory (2009 p.189). This 
means that there will be many cases where it isn't clear what the balance of reasons 
supports. It would be justifiable, in such cases, to judge that an act is supererogatory and 
supported by the balance of reasons but not rationally blameworthy if not performed. Note 
that the same is not true of judgements of moral obligation, judging that something is 
morally obligatory commits us to the view that it is supported by the balance of reasons. If 
we were to discover that the balance of reasons did not support acting in this way we 
would no longer judge it to be obligatory. The same discovery about a judgement of 
supererogation would only lead us to withdraw the judgement if the balance of reasons 
were clear and decisive enough to make us view the act as foolish rather than 
supererogatory. One interesting consequence of this is that someone who excuses a 
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decision not to act in a morally praiseworthy way by claiming that the act was 
supererogatory will still be rationally blameworthy unless they show that the balance of 
reasons was not clear or decisive.
I have argued that feelings of admiration are able to lead to motivation by changing our 
judgement concerning what there is most reason to do. They can do this by bringing to the 
fore the right-making features of an action, leading us to reconsider our judgements about 
what there is most reason to do. This account is compatible with the two constraints I 
mentioned at the beginning of the chapter as admiration will not always lead to motivation 
on this account and they are compatible with a judgement that someone has acted against 
the balance of reason. I defended this account against various ways in which it might be 
argued that feelings of admiration are incompatible with judging that someone has acted 
against the balance of reason. I argued that it is also possible to admire the rationally 
imperfect but not the rationally blameworthy. An interesting consequence of the account I 
have given of how judgements of supererogation can motivate was that in cases where the 
balance of reasons are clear and decisive a judgement of supererogation will either be 
motivating or irrational. While I accepted that this may be seen to be a problematic feature 
of my account it is worth noting that the cases in which the balance of reasons are clear and 
decisive are likely to be rare.
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, after raising the problem of judgements of supererogation for motivational 
judgement internalism I have proposed a way in which internalism can handle this 
problem. In the first chapter of this paper I argued that the internalist claim that there is a 
reliable connection between moral judgements and motivation can be made plausibly about 
judgements of moral obligation but not judgements of supererogation. As a result of this I 
argued that a plausible form of internalism must explain the necessary connection that is 
claimed to exist between moral judgements and motivation in a way that is compatible 
with the existence of a reliable connection between some types of moral judgements but 
not others. In the second chapter I argued that this can be achieved by restricting 
internalism to 'all things considered' normative judgements. This account is able to explain 
why we would expect someone to be motivated by a judgement that an act is morally 
obligatory but not by a judgement that an act is supererogatory. This would suggest that 
internalism has nothing to say about judgements of supererogation. However, while an 
internal connection between judgements of supererogation and motivation may not be 
plausible, I argued that an internal connection between these judgements and a pro-attitude 
that falls short of motivation would allow internalists to propose an internal connection 
between judgements of supererogation and feelings of admiration. I proposed 'admiration' 
as the obvious candidate for this pro-attitude and defended the existence of a necessary 
connection between feelings of admiration and supererogation. In the last chapter I 
explained how feelings of admiration may alter an agents judgement of what is supported 
by the balance of reasons. This account allows internalists to explain the motivational 
power of judgements of supererogation with an internal connection. 
An interesting question that could be dealt with in further research is how this internalist 
account of judgements of supererogation compares with an externalist account and the 
implications of this for the wider debate between internalists and externalists about moral 
judgements. Another issue that arises as a result of this paper concerns the consequences 
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that this account has for other debates about the nature of moral judgements. It is tempting 
to think that the claim that expressivism is in a better position than cognitivism to 
accommodate internalism is reinforced by the idea that different moral judgements bring 
with them different kinds of necessary connections but this is a question for another 
project.
Page 42 of 47
 
Bibliography
Attfield, Robin (1995) Value, Obligation and Meta-Ethics (Amsterdam: Rodopi Bv 
Editions)
Anscombe, G. E. M (1958). 'Modern Moral Philosophy' in Philosophy (Vol.33 No. 124 
pp.1-19)  
Audi, Robert (2005) 'Wrongs Within Rights' in Philosophical Issues (Vol.15 pp.121-139)
Brink, David (1989) Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press)
Broome, John (2007) 'Does Rationality Consist in Responding Correctly to Reasons' in 
Journal of Moral Philosophy (Vol.4 No.3 pp.349-371)
Carwell, Diane. (2007). 'Subway Rescuer Receives the City’s Highest Award' Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/05/nyregion/05life.html. Last accessed 31st July 2011. 
Chrisman, Mathew and Ridge, Mike (Work in Progress) “Ought and Must” 
Colby, Anne and Damon, William (1992) Some Do Care: Contemporary Lives of Moral  
Commitment (New York: The Free Press)
Curtis, Barry (1981) 'The Supererogatory and the Foolish' in Journal of Value Inquiry (Vol 
15 No.4 pp.311-318) 
Daly, Michael. (2010 ). “Real heroes, such as subway savior Wesley Autrey, don't do it for 
the glory” Available: http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-05-
27/local/27065434_1_wesley-autrey-subway-hero-real-heroes . Last accessed 31st July 
2011. 
Page 43 of 47
 
Dancy, Jonathan (2004) Ethics Without Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 
Darwall, Stephen (1983) Impartial Reason (London: Cornell University Press)
Darwall, Stephen (2006) The Second Person Standpoint (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press)
Gert, Joshua (2004) Brute Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
Harman, Gilbert (1999) Reasoning, Meaning and Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Heyd, David (1982) Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press)
Heyd, David (2008) 'Supererogation', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Autumn 
2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/supererogation/>.
Flanagan, Owen (1986) 'Admirable Immorality and Admirable Imperfection' in The 
Journal of Philosophy, (Vol. 83 No. 1 pp. 41-60)
Jollimore, Troy (2006) 'Morally Admirable Immorality' in American Philosophical  
Quarterly Vol. 43 No.2 pp.159-170)
Joyce, Richard (2001) The Myth of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
Kawall, Jason (2009) 'Virtue theory, ideal observers, and the supererogatory' in 
Philosophical Studies (Vol. 109 No. 2) 
Kamm, F. M. (2001) Morality, Morality Volume Two: Rights, Duties and Status (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press)
Kitcher, P. S. (1984). “In Defence of Intentional Psychology”, in Journal of Philosophy 
(Vol.81 pp.89-106) 
Page 44 of 47
 
Mason, Ellinor (2008) 'An Argument Against Motivational Internalism' Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society (Vol.108 pp.135-156)
Mellema, Gregory (1991) Beyond the Call of Duty: Supererogation, Obligation and 
Offence (New York: State University of New York Press)
Mill, John Stuart  (2004) Utilitarianism, Kindle version, accessed 20 June 2011 from 
Amazon.co.uk
Provis, Chris (1981) “Reason and Emotion” in Canadian Journal of Philosophy  (Vol.11 
No.3 p.439-456)
Pybus, Elizabeth M. (1982) 'Saints and Heroes' in Philosophy Vol. 57 No.220 pp.193-199 
(Apr 1982)
Schroeder, Mark (2007) “Teleology, Agent-Relative Value, and the ‘Good’” in Ethics, (Vol. 
117 pp. 265-295)
Slote, Michael (1989) Beyond Optimizing (Cambridge: Harvard University Press)
Smith, Adam (2007) The Theory of Moral Sentiments (New York: Cosimo) 
Smith, Michael (1994) The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell)
Stich, S. (1996) Deconstructing the Mind (New York: Oxford University Press)
Stocker, Michael (1979) 'Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology' in Journal of  
Philosophy (1979  pp738-52)
Suikkanen, Jussi (2009) 'Consequentialism, Constraints and the Good-Relative-to: A
Reply to Mark Schroeder.' in Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy  (pp.1-8)
Page 45 of 47
 
Svavarsdóttir, Sigrun (1999) 'Moral Cognitivism and Motivation', Philosophical Review 
(Vol. 108 No. 29 pp.161-219) 
Rosati, Connie S. (2008) 'Moral Motivation', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/moral-motivation/> 
Urmson, J. O. (1958) 'Saints and Heroes' Reprinted in Moral Concepts Joel Feinberg (ed.) 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1969) 
van der Burg, Wibren and Taekema, Sanne (2004) 'Motivation by Ideal' in Philosophical  
Explorations (Vol. 7 No.1  pp.91-98)
van de Ven, N. Zeelenberg, M. and Pieters, R. (2011) 'Why envy outperforms admiration' 
in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin (Vol.37 No.6 pp.784-95)
Wallace, R. Jay (2009) 'Practical Reason', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/practical-reason/> 
Watson, Gary (1987) 'Responsibility and the Limits of Evil.' in Schoeman, Ferdinand, ed.. 
Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions. (New York: Cambridge University Press) 
Watson, Gary (2007) 'Morality as Equal Accountabiliy: Comments on Darwall's the 
Second Person Standpoint' in Ethics (118 No.1 pp.37-51)
Wedgewood, Ralph (2007) The Nature of Normativity (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
Williams, Bernard (1981) Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
Wolf, Susan (1982) 'Saints and Heroes' in Journal of Philosophy (Vol.79 No.8  pp.419-439)
Page 46 of 47
 
Zimmerman, Michael J. (1996) The Concept of Moral Obligation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press)
Page 47 of 47
